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ABSTRACT:  Retail competition has been introduced in many states as part of electricity industry 
deregulation. Following problems in the electricity market in California in 2000/01 many states, 
including NC, put deregulation plans on hold. Where retail competition is allowed consumers can 
choose their electricity supplier, and companies can compete for customers on the basis of rates and/or 
other options such as green energy choices. The welfare benefits of retail competition depend on 
consumers’ willingness to switch suppliers, and in many cases people choose to stay with their current 
supplier even though rivals offer savings. In that sense consumers are ‘sticky’ in the same way they are 
with other services such as banking and credit.  The question then becomes: should states reconsider 
retail competition or stay with the status quo?  To help answer this question we survey residents in two 
North Carolina counties.  Our survey focuses on:  (i) households’ knowledge of and interest in retail 
competition (ii) factors that would encourage them to switch suppliers, with an emphasis on smart 
meters and (iii) how large the potential savings would have to be to encourage switching.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
Despite nearly two decades of preparation and a number of state level attempts, competition in 
electricity supply remains tentative for large parts of the US. A number of federal regulatory Acts and 
Orders helped lay the foundation for wholesale and retail competition. Three notable examples were 
the 1992 Energy Policy Act and FERC Orders 888 and 889 of 1996. The 1992 Act empowered “FERC 
to order vertically integrated electric utilities to deliver competitive generated power over their 
transmission lines to wholesale customers, a process known as wholesale wheeling (Sidak and Spulber, 
1998).” The 1996 Orders made the 1992 Energy Act more comprehensive by requiring transmission 
operators to allow open access to their networks on the basis of non-discriminatory tariffs. Order 888 
also contained a concession from regulators to the incumbent utilities allowing them to recoup the cost 
of investments made before deregulation that may not have been cost effective under competition. The 
question then becomes: is now the time to expand retail competition in the residential sector. 
Using survey data, we estimate factors affecting the desirability of (residential) retail 
competition to consumers in Western North Carolina. State level research on the feasibility of retail 
competition has tapered off since the break down of the competitive market in California in 2001. This 
is a problem since the rhetoric around restructuring in utility industries has recently become very 
focused on the demand side of the market. Figures 1a and 1b show the status of restructuring efforts in 
the US in 2001 and in 2010, respectively. In the figure for 2010 we have superimposed the average 
residential price for electricity in 1998, two years after FERC Orders 888 and 889. We chose to 
illustrate prices in 1998 because, although the restructuring debate and requisite (federal) legislation 
occurred earlier, restructuring and/or competition itself was beginning in some markets at that time 
(e.g., California and Massachusetts). Average prices go a long way in explaining restructuring efforts 
across states. In most currently “active states” the average retail price was above the national average 
in 1998; the two exceptions were Texas and Oregon. In contrast, all of the “not active” states excluding 
Iowa, Alaska and Hawaii had rates below the national average. The “suspended” states had rates 
roughly in line with the national average apart from California, one of the earliest states to restructure. 
Overall, the average price in active states was 10.32¢/kWh while in suspended and non-active states it 
was 8.09¢ and 6.32¢, respectively (excluding Alaska and Hawaii where rates were well above the 
national average). 
Many states, including North Carolina halted restructuring plans following the collapse of the 
California market in 2001.
1 A commission on the Future of Electric Service recommended to the state 
                                                            
1 See Blumstein, Freidman and Green (2002) for a thoughtful discussion of the history of events in the California market. 3 
 
legislator in April 2000 that NC deregulate by January 2005 with fifty percent of customers being 
given supply choice at that time and the remainder a year later. By January 2001 these plans were 
postponed.
2  Comparing the maps in Figure 1a and 1b it is clear that many states backed off on their 












For various reasons, restructuring and energy efficiency goals have recently become more 
concentrated on the demand side of the market. Former discussions and academic pursuits focused on 
creating and improving markets for power generation. This, in many cases, involved breaking up 
integrated companies into transmission, generation, and retail functions. Thus, the natural monopoly 
transmission segments of the market were separated from the potentially competitive generation and 
retail functions. In some markets, such as Great Britain, and some regions such as Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland (PJM) this process moved forward relatively quickly. In the England and Wales 
market (which has since been expanded to include Scotland) the restructuring process began in the late 
eighties and early nineties and the residential market was opened to competition as early as 1998. The 
US market by contrast is much more complex and segmented, and many policies are determined at the 
state level. Not surprisingly, the process has been slower in the US. 
                                                            
2 EIA, Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html, and The Chronical.com (April 9, 2000), 






Figure 1b. Restructuring as of September 2010. Source: EIA. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html
Real residential prices (¢/kWh), 1998. US average residential price 8.26¢/kWh. Source:ElectricPower Annua















































There is an expectation that increased focus on the demand side will lead to more innovations and 
value added than continued emphasis on cost cutting at the wholesale level: 
 
“Arguably most of the efficiency gains from restructuring will come from the demand 
side…Unfortunately, nearly all markets have paid too little attention to the demand side, and 
many markets began by effectively killing retail competition. This is unfortunate, since the 
much needed innovation on demand management systems and contracts is likely to come from 
retail competition.” (Cramton, 2003, p. 6). 
 
The current stock of residential meters must be replaced to enable real consumer response to 
changing prices, but hardware and installation costs have historically been prohibitively high. These 
costs continue to decline, however, and many utilities are now installing smart meters in their service 
areas.
3 This proactive move is partly in anticipation of future requirements to move retail customers to 
time varying tariffs even though the meters will not immediately be used for that purpose. Utilities 
have also benefited from $3.9 billion in stimulus money earmarked for investments in smart grid 
technology and electric transmission infrastructure.  
It makes sense to adopt more digital technologies in the home if those technologies are cost 
effective and improve market efficiency. For example, Google PowerMeter offers customers fitted 
with a smart meter the ability to see how much power their home is using. A local power company, 
Blue Ridge Electric, has a webpage explaining to its smart meter customers how to install and use this 
Google software.
4  
Likewise, the internet makes it easier to educate customers and provide price comparisons. For 
example, The Texas Electric Choice, and Pennsylvania’s PA Power Switch websites help consumers 
compare prices and choose new suppliers.
5 Consumers without consistent internet access and some 
older residential customers would be disadvantaged, however, if the internet became the primary 
source of information dissemination. This disadvantage could be minimized through the use of 
aggregated communities of individuals, some of whom will be better informed than others. Littlechild 
(2008) describes the use of aggregation in Ohio. 
Joskow (2000) discusses various ways for retail competition to provide value added: 
 
                                                            
3 Cost plus installation is approximately $100 per household (based on private conversations with a utility provider and 
Allcott, 2009). 
4 http://www.blueridgeemc.com/member-services/google_powermeter.asp. 
5 http://www.powertochoose.org/ and http://www.papowerswitch.com/shop-for-electricity/, respectively. 5 
 
“…the primary social value of increasing [the] role of [electricity service providers] is 
to provide enhanced customer services which provide value added to consumers over 
and above what consumers realize by purchasing at wholesale through the [electric 
distribution company]. These services include enhanced metering and control 
technologies, price and consumption hedge contracts, total energy management 
services, bundling of a gas, electric, telephone service…” (Joskow, 2000, p.5) 
 
Joskow (2000) goes on to describe how retail competition could improve the performance of 
wholesale electricity markets. He cites these potential benefits: “increased liquidity in spot and forward 
markets, demand management in response to spot market price movements to mitigate market power 
problems when capacity is scarce and demand is otherwise inelastic, and contracting to insure against 
price spikes,” (p. 8). 
Giving consumers access to time varying or real time prices would potentially add value in the 
industry if demand elasticity increased. As long as most consumers remain on regulated tariffs there is 
little reason for them to make behavioral changes that take the relative price of power into account. An 
overall increase in tariffs would have some effect on consumption, but not in a way that would bring 
down the cost of delivering power. To do that there has to be less consumption at the peak when the 
distribution network is most stressed. Pilot studies examining the effects of time varying prices have 
not found substantial customer savings, however. For example, Allcott (2009) used data from a 
Chicago pilot study and found that transitioning from flat rates to real time prices resulted in a 
compensating variation for participating households of about $10 per year or 1-2% of electricity 
expenditure. Overall the benefits might be lower since households self-selected into the experiment 
and likely had higher than average price responsiveness. 
There remain important downsides and uncertainties associated with retail competition. While 
many agree that the potential benefits of competition outweigh the cost for large industrial and 
commercial customers, the anticipated costs and potential for abuse are greater for residential 
customers. Finding the best competitive model, devising default services for customers unlikely to 
switch suppliers, and handling regulatory uncertainty are additional challenges. Nevertheless, retail 
competition is becoming more feasible, so we ask whether households in two North Carolina counties 
would be interested in having access to smart meters and competitive electricity supply.  In addition, 
we ask what level of savings would incent them to switch providers. Our survey results, their 
connection to the previous studies and state level experiences are discussed below. 
 6 
 
Section 2: Survey and Data Analysis 
Two North Carolina counties were chosen for the survey. Watauga County is located in the  
mountains in the northwest part of the state. The population is approximately 46,000 and peak energy 
use occurs in the winter. The town of Boone and Appalachian State University are in Watauga County. 
Forsyth County is more urban and warmer though still located in the northwest portion of the state. 
Forsyth has a population of approximately 360,000; Winston Salem is the largest city and Wake Forest 
and Winston Salem University both are in Forsyth County.
6  
The mail survey was conducted in October and November 2009. The first mailing consisted of 
2100 households, half in Watauga County and half in Forsyth County, North Carolina. Approximately 
10% of the surveys were undelivered, leaving us with 891 delivered in Watauga and 991 in Forsyth. A 
follow-up postcard was sent to all households approximately one week after the initial mailing. 
Excluding bad addresses, a second mailing of the full survey was sent to all non-responders 3 weeks 
later. In total we received 372 responses from Watauga households (42% of delivered surveys) and 357 
responses from Forsyth households (36% of delivered surveys). Table 1 shows the demographic 
characteristics of our sample. 
 
Table 1: Demographic Data 
 Watauga  Forsyth 
Average income  62,879   73,197  
Age
7 61  61 
Male (%)  59   63 
% of sample with some undergraduate education  47   59 
% of sample with some graduate education  29    22  
% of responders who are responsible for paying 
the electricity bill 
86    85  
 
This paper discusses three basic questions. First, what is the current level of familiarity with 
retail competition and what characteristics result in individuals being more favorable toward it? 
                                                            
6 Forsyth County was chosen as a second survey area because it is more urban and warmer than Watauga County while 
being closer to Appalachian State University than more metropolitan areas such as Mecklenburg County where Charlotte is 




Second, what supply options (not currently received) would entice households to consider an 
alternative supplier? Third, holding supply characteristics constant, how much would the monthly 
electricity bill have to decline to encourage switching? 
In general, we find that fewer than half the sample respondents in both counties are currently 
familiar with retail competition but more than half would favor it. Similarly, approximately three-
quarters consider it important to be able to choose their electricity provider. We also asked responders 
about their experience switching suppliers in other industries. Approximately 30% of the overall 
sample had switched either their telephone or television provider in the past three years. This 
experience might affect how comfortable they are with the process of changing providers and may also 
affect their attitude toward competition in utility markets. 
In Table 2, we focus on attributes of service that might entice responders to switch to an 
alternative provider, assuming all other aspects of their service remained the same.   
 
Table 2: Switching preferences 
% customers who would (very or somewhat likely) 
switch if offered: 
Watauga Forsyth 
          Smart/hourly meter (no fee)  65    57  
          Incentives to weatherize  62    62  
          Green energy options  61    63  
          Green options but $5/month bill increase
8  30    36  
 
We find that access to smart matters, incentives to weatherize and a free green energy option 
would all encourage a majority of respondent to switch providers.  Green energy options with a fee 
increase would only encourage about a third of respondents to change providers. The data in Table 2 
underestimate the actual percentages because subjects who responded that their provider already offers 
green options or incentives to weatherize are not included (approximately 19% of the overall sample). 
We did not include improved reliability as a reason to switch since current providers continue to 
maintain the distribution lines under most competition models.  
                                                            
8 For many respondents this question was a missing value. We recoded the variable as 0 if they responded ‘not likely’ or 
‘don’t know’ to the previous question which asked how likely they would be to switch if another company offered more 
green energy options (such as  purchasing more power from renewable sources like solar and wind). 8 
 
Finally, we present the results from the regression analysis. Our dependent variable is 
‘savings’, the amount a household stated their electricity bill would have to fall (all else equal) to 
encourage them to switch to another supplier. The distribution of responses is shown in Table 3.
9 
 
Table 3: Savings required to switch providers 
D5. If another company offered exactly the same services and quality as your current electricity 
provider, how much would your electricity bill have to decrease each month to encourage you to 
switch to the other company (Please circle one)          
  $0 - $4  $5 - $9  $10 - $14  $15 - $20  > $20  Don’t know  Average savings 
Watauga(%) 3  8  20  21  29  19  $17.04 
Forsyth(%) 4  10  24  22  26  16  $16.22 
 
The data is both left and right censored, so we use a Tobit model for this part of the 
analysis. The Tobit model specification is:       ′     where   is a continuous random 
variable with mean zero and variance σ .   
  is a latent variable with: 
 
  
     
  
           
    
       
    
       
    
  
 
The expected value of the dependent variable is: 
   |                     |                   |                      |      |            
where a and b are constants taking on values of 2 and 25, respectively in our model.
10 
 
As a check on the sign and significance of the Tobit results, we also estimated an ordered logit 
model where the dependent variable is the ordinal value of responses; e.g., 0-4 was coded as 1, etc. 
The ‘don’t know’ responses were excluded. The Tobit and ordered logit results are shown in Table 4.  
  
                                                            
9 The data for the value question were coded at the midpoint of the intervals in Table 3 except for ‘More than $20’ which 
was coded as 25. We therefore estimated a Tobit model allowing for both left and right hand censoring (at 2 and 25).  
10 Greene(2003). 9 
 
Table 4. Tobit models using marginal effects, and ordered logit using robust standard errors.  
y = savings. p-values are in parentheses. 






predicted value  
 













Age -.0242   
 (0.048) 
-.0240 
(0.052)     
-.0106 
(0.075) 










(0.029)     
-.7422 
(0.063) 
College  -1.4702   
(0.002) 
-1.4917 









Favor     -.7339 
(0.038)     
-.3334 
(0.075) 
Priorswitch   -6691   
(0.062)       
-.3237 
(0.063) 
N 507  504  504 
Left censored  22  22   
Right Censored  165  165   
 
Model 1 does not control for respondents’ prior experience switching providers in other 
industries (priorswitch) or whether they favor competition (favor). These controls are added in models 
two and three. The results for the demographic variables do not change substantially when these two 
variables are included.  
Respondents with a college education require less savings to switch suppliers than those with a 
high school education, and adding professional/post-graduate education lowers the savings more. Of 
course, education is correlated with income which is also significant but positive.
11 Age and race are 
negative and significant meaning older respondents require less savings to switch and whites require 
less than non-whites.
12 Being favorable towards competition and having experience switching in other 
industries reduces respondents required savings also. 
                                                            
11 With an interaction term between the education variables and income, the education variables remain significant, but not 
income.  
12 We note, however, that there is not much variation in our race variable. 10 
 
To determine characteristics that make respondents more favorable toward competition we 
estimated a logit model with the form: 
             |    
1
1     ′        where 
    ′                                                                                  
               .   
These results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Logit model,  y = favor retail competition (p-values) 
n = 612  Prob > chi
2 = .0001 
Constant -20.019 
(.108) 
County  -.2056     
(.245)  
Income  .00000137     
(.659) 
Age  .0101             
(.113)  
Male  .3375            
(.061)  
Race  -.0091              
(.984)      
College  .4649           
(.047)  





Respondents with either a college education or a professional degree are both more favorable towards 
competition than those with a high school education but the coefficient on the professional degree is 
only significant at the 10% level. Males are also somewhat more likely to favor competition than 
females. Lastly having experience switching in other industries increases the probability of  favoring 
competition between electricity providers suggesting that individuals who have switched either their 
telephone or television suppliers find these choices beneficial and would like to have them available in 




Section 3: Discussion. 
North Carolina has relatively low residential electricity rates though they are close to the 
national average. Table 6 shows the rates for the four providers in our survey areas.   
 
Table 6: rates and ownership for the electricity companies in our survey area   
 
New River Light and Power Company is owned by Appalachian State University and has a very small, 
dense customer base in downtown Boone, North Carolina. Blue Ridge Electric services other areas of 
Boone and the remainder of Watauga County. Duke Energy supplies most of the customers in Forsyth 
County; a few are served by Energy United. 
Based on model 2 in Table 4 the probability of ‘savings’ being uncensored and the conditional 
predicted value of ‘savings’ are:
13 
 
P(2 ≤ savings ≤ 25) = .6931 
E(savings|2 ≤ savings ≤ 25) = 15.30 
 
The conditional (censored) reduction on the electricity bill that would incent customers to switch 
suppliers is $15.30/month across the two counties (all else equal). To compute a rough estimate of the 
equivalent reduction in tariff rates we use summary data for NC as a whole. The average monthly 
residential consumption in NC for 2008 was 1120 kWh; the average bill was $106.61 and the average 
price was 9.52¢/kWh.
14  A reduction in the monthly bill of $15.30 would be a reduction of  
approximately 14.35% a month or 1.37¢/kWh. 
                                                            
13 These estimates are calculated using Stata where the mean of the independent variables is used for predicted values. 
14 U.S. Energy Information Association, Table 5A. Residential Average Monthly Bill by Census Division, and State 2008. 
Utility Ownership  Average  residential 
rate cents/kWh 
Number of NC 
Customers 
Blue Ridge Electric  Cooperative  11.01  61,640 








Duke Investor  Owned  8.22 1,563,543 
EnergyUnited Cooperative 10.33  104,083 
NC   9.52   
US   11.26   
Source: EIA. Electricity Sales, Revenue, Average Price 2008. Table 6 and Table 5a. 12 
 
  Is this a realistic reduction in rates?  It is tempting to answer this question by looking at the 
experience of states with residential retail competition. Kwoka (2008) discusses the problems with that 
approach. For example, some states introduced competition as early as 1996 and rates were initially 
capped to allow utilities to recover stranded costs. In many cases those caps are just expiring. Where 
they have expired more companies have entered the market to compete. Some utility’s rates increased 
after the cap expired because they had not previously risen to account for increased generation costs. 
Pennsylvania’s experience illustrates this. Seven of eleven investor owned utilities had their caps 
expire before or during 2009. In 2009, five of these 7 suppliers all had average retail rates above 
Pennsylvania’s national average of 11.35 ¢/kWh. Table 7 shows average residential prices for these 11 
companies in 2008 and 2009.  
 
Table 7: Prices and proportion of customers for 11 Pennsylvania Investor Owned Utilities.
 
 
Another (popular) example is the case of San Diego where rates were allowed to adjust 
competitively in 2000. The wholesale market in California was restructured in 1998 but retail rates 
remained fixed. As discussed in Bushnell and Mansur (2005) SDG&E recovered stranded costs by the 
middle of 1999 allowing them to adjust rates to match market prices. Rates fell slightly in the 
beginning but almost doubled by August 2000 when there was a sharp increase in wholesale prices. 
This led to a retroactive rate freeze for small and medium sized customers. Bushnell and Mansur 
Company  Rate Cap Status  % of PA Ratepayers  2008¢/kWh 2009¢/kWh
Citizens Electric Co.  Expired  0.1 11.02 11.10
Duquesne Light Co.  Expired  10.6 13.45 13.58
Pennsylvania Power Co.  Expired  2.8 12.00 12.66
Pike County Light & Power Co.  Expired  0.1 16.37 12.79
UGI Utilities Inc.  Expired  1.1 13.61 13.87
Wellsboro Electric Co.  Expired  0.1 13.89 13.19
PPL Electric Utilities Inc.  Dec. 31, 2009  24.6 10.18 10.33
Metropolitan‐Edison Co.  Dec. 31, 2010  9.5 10.43 11.38
Pennsylvania Electric Co.  Dec. 31, 2010  10.6 10.30 10.47
PECO Energy Co.  Dec. 31, 2010  27.8 14.42 14.43





examined the demand response to the volatile price signals that occurred during this period. They find 
consumers are more responsive to the prices they saw in their last bill than to current market prices. 
“During the months when retail rates were deregulated for all SDG&E customers, we estimate an 
elasticity of demand with respect to lagged prices (which nearly doubled by August, 2000) equal to  
-0.10. By contrast, the effect of current prices on current consumption is not significant after retail 
rates were deregulated. With our [difference-in-difference] model, we find a reduction in average 
consumption of approximately 5% when prices peaked in August and an even larger 7% reduction in 
September, after most customers’ prices returned to historic levels” (p.495). They caution these results 
are not long run results since consumers could be expected to be more price responsive if prices 
remained high for a longer period of time. Moreover, consumers were receiving very mixed signals via 
the legislative actions taken to reduce tariffs. 
North Carolina’s generation mix is very different from California’s where electricity prices rose 
largely because of rising natural gas prices around the time San Diego’s rates were adjusting. Figure 2 
shows average wholesale prices and natural gas prices in the US 2001-2007 while Figure 3 shows the 
generation mix in NC, the US and California. NC’s electricity sector is more coal and nuclear intensive 
than the rest of the country and California’s industry is much more natural gas intensive; thus, 























Figure 2. Sources: U.S. EIA, Form EIA-861, Annual Electric Power Industry Report. 
Table 2. Average Wholesale Price by NERC Region, 2001 - 2007 





In Texas, where retail competition began in 2002 and has largely been viewed as a success, 
price caps expired in 2007. Kang and Zarnikau (2009) show evidence that prices have since begun to 
fall. The electricity industry in Texas is also heavily reliant on natural gas, so electricity prices rose 
steadily along with natural gas prices in 2004 and 2005. According to Kang and Zarnikau, electricity 
prices remained high even when natural gas prices began declining in 2006 (figure 1, page 1715). 
In general a state’s experience with retail competition will depend on its policy toward stranded 
cost recovery, strategies for providing default services to customers who choose not to switch suppliers 
and its current generation mix. North Carolina’s access to cheap coal has kept prices below the 
national average, but prices could increase as the state’s commitment to greener technologies 
strengthens. As that happens there will be more avenues for suppliers to provide value added services, 
and the support for competition could improve as a result. 
 
Section 4 Conclusion 
We conducted a mail survey of two disparate counties in western North Carolina to gauge 
consumers’ opinions about retail competition among electricity providers and to estimate their 
required savings to switch providers. Just under half of our respondents claimed to know 
something about electricity retail competition; about 75% of responders in each county believe it 
is important that consumers be able to choose their utility provider, and 50-65% favor retail 
competition in N.C. Our results show that respondents with undergraduate and post-graduate 


















Figure 3. Source:  EIA, Table 5. Electric Power Industry Generation by Primary Energy Source, 2008 15 
 
are somewhat more likely to favor competition than females. Respondents who have recently 
switched television or phone providers are more likely to favor competition, and they would 
require less savings to switch than those who have not recently switched providers in these other 
industries. On average households state they would be willing to switch electricity providers (all 
else equal) for a rate reduction of approximately 1.4¢/kWh. There were no strong differences 
between the two counties.  
Given that prices in N.C. are still regulated and below the national average, savings of 
this magnitude are unlikely because it would make it difficult for alternative suppliers to 
compete. Value added services from smart meters could bring down competitors’ costs, but not 
necessarily below the incumbents’ (some of which have already rolled out smart meters). 
Consumers may gain more from the benefits of smart grid technologies and time varying prices 
than from possibilities to switch providers.  Given the current state of regulation in North 
Carolina the cost savings need to encourage retail competition is unlikely.  So to answer the 
question: “is now the time to allow retail competition in the residential sector in North 
Carolina?”  Our survey suggests that from a purely consumer welfare perspective the answer is 
no. If, however, retail competition encourages cost savings on the production side then the 
answer might be yes but that is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
In the future we would like to conduct a larger study of the southeastern US to form a  
better picture of consumer preferences in this part of the country where electricity has been  
historically cheap due largely to the dominance of coal (and nuclear) in the generation mix.  
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